Carreras v. City of Anaheim (9th Cir 1985) 768 F. 2d 1039, 1046:
Re: Freedom of Speech: "Annoyance & inconvenience is a small price to pay for the preservation of our most precious right!"

Hamburg v. Walmart Stores, Inc. (App. 1 Dist. 2004) 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 568, 116 Cal.App. 4th 497, as modified; [Below is a detailed quote of a large part of the Hamburg decision]:

"The protestors had been collecting signatures on petitions to qualify a voter initiative and carrying signs bearing messages such as "Free speech" on a median approximately 25 feet from the store's entrance and on the sidewalk along the front of the store. They did not use the four-by-six area designated by the store for expressive activities....the reasonableness of the store's time, place, and manner restrictions and the protestors' refusal to be bound by them did not establish that the protestors committed the crime (Pen. Code 602.1, subd. (a)) for which they were placed under citizen's arrest. A protestor who refuses to comply with reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions can, in appropriate circumstances, be enjoined by the landowner [restrained by court order] from carrying out expressive activities...but the refusal to comply does not constitute misdemeanor trespass under 602.1, subd. (a), unless it consists of intentional interference with the landowner's business through the obstruction or intimidation of its customers...Moreover, since the arrests, which were central to both claims made by the protestors, were made by the store manager, a private citizen, it was necessary that the offenses have been committed in the manager's presence. (Pen. Code 837, subd. 1.) The court held that it was not necessary to determine whether the protestors actually committed the trespasses for which they were arrested, because the store manager did not assert or imply that the acts for which he arrested them were committed in his presence...

"(3) Trespass 2--Misdemeanor--Definitions and Distinctions--Intentional Interference With Business Establishment.--Pen. Code 602.1, subd. (a), makes it a misdemeanor to intentionally interfere with a lawful business establishment open to the public, by obstructing or intimidating those attempting to carry on business at the establishment and refusing to leave the premises after being requested to do so.

"(4) Trespass 5--Misdemeanor Trespass--Acts Constituting Crimes--Violation of Time, Place and Manner Restrictions.--A person who [*499]?nbsp; refuses to consider him- or herself bound by "time, place and manner" restrictions on public protest, or who violates one or more particular restriction, does not necessarily commit the criminal offense defined by Pen. Code 602.1, subd. (a). A protestor who refuses to comply with reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions can, in appropriate circumstances, be enjoined by the landowner from carrying out expressive activities, or even ejected from the premises; but the refusal to comply does not constitute misdemeanor trespass unless it consists of intentional interference with the landowner's business through the obstruction or intimidation of its customers.

"(5) Arrest 31--Arrest Without Warrant--Misdemeanor--Arrest by Private Person--Presence.--A private citizen may arrest another for a misdemeanor only when the offense has actually been committed or attempted in his or her presence. (Pen. Code 837, subd. 1.) The mere fact that the private person has reasonable cause to believe a misdemeanor offense has been committed or attempted in his or her presence is not enough. "Presence" is not mere physical proximity but is determined by whether the offense is apparent to the senses of the person who makes the arrest.

"(6) Arrest 31--Arrest Without Warrant--Generally--Arrest by Private Person--Presence--Good Faith Belief.--A store manager's declaration that did not assert or even imply that the acts for which he arrested protestors were committed in his presence and his claim that he acted in the good faith belief that the protestors were trespassing based on his discussions with police officers and, inferentially, customer complaints, was not a sufficient basis for a citizen arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor."

"...the evidence respondents submitted in support of their motion for summary judgment establishes that the offense (if there was one) was not committed or attempted in Estes's [Walmart manager who committed false arrest]?nbsp;presence."
"The evidence submitted by respondents in support of the motion for summary judgment consisted exclusively of limited portions of the deposition [*505]?nbsp; testimony of each of the eight appellants, n3 appellant Hamburg's responses to form interrogatories, and the declaration of respondent Estes. Estes's declaration was accompanied by a copy of the incident report of the Ukiah Police, copies of three complaints Wal-Mart received from customers regarding appellants' activities, and a copy of Wal-Mart's "Rules [***13]?nbsp; and Regulations for Petitioning and Soliciting from Wal-Mart California Property...

"All appellants except David Drell, who was a coordinator of the protest, admitted they made no effort to identify themselves in advance to Wal-Mart management...

"Appellants' confined most of their activities to a landscaped median approximately 25 feet from the front entrance to the store and the sidewalk along the front of the store. They did not use the four-by-six-foot area designated by Wal-Mart for expressive activities because that space was being used by two individuals soliciting donations to a children's program...

"First, petitioning and soliciting is only permitted 'in designated areas specified by Wal-Mart.'

"(3) The reasonableness of Wal-Mart's "time, place and manner" restrictions and respondents' refusal to be bound by them do not, however, establish that appellants committed the crime for which they were placed under citizen's arrest, which is defined in section 602.1, subdivision (a) of the Penal Code. As noted (ante, at p. 507, fn. 4), that statute makes it a misdemeanor to intentionally interfere with a lawful business establishment open to the public, "by obstructing or intimidating those attempting to carry on business" at the establishment and refusing to leave the premises after being requested to do so.

"(4) A person who refuses to consider her or himself bound by "time, [***24] place and manner" restrictions, or who violates one or more particular restriction, does not necessarily commit the criminal offense defined by Penal Code section 602.1, subdivision (a). As we have seen, Wal-Mart's "time, place and manner" rules include one restriction (prohibiting efforts to "impede, obstruct or interfere with any customer of the store") that is conterminous with the prohibition of that statute, as well as other restrictions, such as the requirement of insurance coverage, that are not...

"the refusal to comply does not constitute misdemeanor trespass unless it consists of intentional interference with the landowner's business through the obstruction or intimidation of its customers...The constitutionality of the rules does not govern the lawfulness of the arrests.

"The only evidence respondents provided relating to these questions was the declaration of Estes, the store manager, and the three written customer complaints he gave the police, earlier described. Estes does not declare that he observed appellants, or any of them, obstructing or intimidating any Wal-Mart customer, but merely that, at the time of the incident, the store had received "numerous" complaints from customers and employees "concerning aggressive and harassing conduct by [appellants] and others in their group." The customers whose complaints have been made a part of the record indicated only that they were offended by appellants' conduct. One complainant stated that she was "not happy [with] the way [the protestors] approach people," but no customer indicated that he or she?nbsp;[***28] had been obstructed from carrying on business with Wal-Mart or intimidated, or even that appellants attempted to prevent them from shopping at Wal-Mart. [*511]

"In In re Wallace (1970) 3 Cal.3d 289 [90 Cal. Rptr. 176, 475 P.2d 208], petitioners for habeas corpus had been arrested for allegedly obstructing a county fair by handing out leaflets protesting the effects on farm workers of automation of agriculture. After trial, the petitioners were found guilty of trespass in violation of Penal Code section 602, subdivision (j), making punishable the entry of lands with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or injuring any lawful business of the landowner. The Supreme Court granted writ relief for the failure of the evidence to establish that the petitioners' leafleting activity constituted "obstruction" within the meaning of the statute. The evidence in Wallace showed that the petitioners stood in a pathway " 'stopping patrons and soliciting them,' " but that patrons who wished to inspect the exhibit at which petitioners were conducting their activity could do so " 'by avoiding the area where [petitioners] were standing.' " ( Id. at p. 294.) [***29] The court found the evidence insufficient, pointing out that "any visitor to a fair or other public exhibition necessarily occupies a certain area of ground or floor [**580] space wherever he stands, and persons wishing to proceed past him are manifestly required to 'avoid' that area under pain of tort liability ... .[P]etitioners were not in fact arrested because of any physical 'obstruction' they may have caused, but simply because they insisted on their lawful right to distribute leaflets and to display signs." ( Id. at p. 295.) This appears also to have been the case here.

"(5) Furthermore, it is not even necessary to determine whether appellants committed the trespass for which they were arrested if the offenses (assuming they took place) were not "committed or attempted" in the presence of the private person who arrested them. "The authority of a private citizen to make an arrest is more limited than that of a peace officer. A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant whenever he has probable cause to believe that the person has committed a misdemeanor in his presence. [Citation.] A private citizen, however, may arrest another for a misdemeanor only when the offense has actually been committed or attempted in his presence. (Pen. Code 837, subd. 1.)" n7 ( Cervantez v. [**581]?nbsp; J.C. Penney Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 587 [156 Cal. Rptr. 198, 595 P.2d 975], italics added.) The mere fact that the private person has reasonable cause to?nbsp;[***32]?nbsp; believe a misdemeanor offense has been committed or attempted in his presence is not enough. ( People v. Martin (1964) 225 Cal. App. 2d 91, 94 [36 Cal. Rptr. 924]; Collins v. Owens (1947) 77 Cal. App. 2d 713, 718 [176 P.2d 372].) As this division has stated, "presence" is not mere physical proximity but is determined by whether the offense is "apparent to the senses" of the person who makes the arrest. ( People v. Sjosten, supra, 262 Cal. App. 2d at pp. 543-544.)"

Hamburg makes it clear, time, place, & manner restrictions, such as location in front of store where activities are allowed, req. of advance notice, etc., if reasonable, as the US Constitutional case law req's, ethically should be respected, but violation of such restrictions does not amount to violation of the law, such as PC 602.1(a) (interference with business). Additionally, mere complaints by customers, in & of themselves, no matter how many or how few, cannot be the basis of interference with business allegations; first of all, stopping or approaching or speaking to customers as they pass by, absent any blocking or interfering with their ingress or egress, etc., far from being interference with business, is the very heart & soul of the rights free speech protects; if everyone agreed on every single issue, there would be no need for free speech; therefore complaints that such activities are occurring are prima facie void; second of all, a customer complaint that consists of allegations amounting to intereference with business still isn't enough for a manager or owner, etc., who hasn't personally witnessed such violation, to make a citizens arrest or file charges of interference with business; according to Hamburg, the manager, etc. making the citizen's arrest must have personally witness the alleged violation.