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IMPEACH TRUMP!


Kids - increase your A-W-Rpms! (Arithmetic-Writing-Reading revs)
The Holy Battle Cry: Mortal Combat - Make Them Have A Heart!

CALL THE PENTAGON! DEMAND REVOLUTION! 760-725-5799 | WILL THE REAL DAVID & GOLIATH PLEASE STAND UP?!
EXPLODE FOR GOD! | DAVIS FOUNDATION PULLED DOWN (PROV. 21:22) | JUSTICE NOW! | REBELS ATTACKED CALIFORNIA! | EVIDENCE OF POLICE TREACHERY | CONSUMER I.D.'INGS TRANSLATE TO SHOOTING SPREES | GOVERNMENT PLOT FOR MY DEMISE | TERRORISTS (ROTATING REPORTS)


1 2 3 4
1-Hangman gallows Davis Commons, 2008; 2-Cage in base of gallows, Davis Comm.; 3-Hangman structure at Orange Court, Davis, w/rope; 4-Pic. of similar gallows structure from Old West or England

"THE UNITED STATES MARINES - WHICH WAY SHOULD YOU RUN?"
Message appeared at the end of US Marines recruiting commercial on TV (ESPN2) in approx. March 2014. You're either running to the Marines & telling them who you are & what you know about the rebellion, or you're one of the rebels, & you're going to be running from the Marines when they attack the rebels! There's no middle ground! As far as I know, it wasn't directed exclusively at Davis, but the whole nation. I've had dreams of China attacking our nation due largely to the acquiescense to the rebellion freely occurring in public places & in the media.
RUN TO THE MARINES! TELL THEM WHO YOU ARE & WHAT YOU KNOW.


I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT ON 28 August 2013 I PUBLICLY DECLARED WAR ON DAVIS, ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA!
Gallows constructed of I-beams, with a hostage in the base of the gallows, located in Davis Commons shopping center in 2003; one year later I disappeared for 2 1/2 years, held hostage in jail pursuant to kangaroo trials & false convictions orchestrated using 911 phone calls to police; I-beams most likely referring to 9/11 Twin Towers destruction & attempt to cover-up their guilt.
Executed in Davis Ca. on 20 Sept. 2013

/s/Joseph A. Sherman

Free Speech & Freedom of Assembly Rights
Use 'em or lose 'em!

COURAGEOUS TEEN FRIENDS

False witnesses will perish, & those who listen to them will be destroyed forever
Prov. 21:28

COURT-DOCUMENTED PROOF OF VIOLATIVE ACTS
Joe Sherman
530-933-2435

joesherman.net
- Davis post office has crumbled -
Use Fedex w/advance notice
[email protected]



Union General William Tecumseh Sherman of the Civil War

Yolo d.a. & 3 consecutive Davis chiefs of police gone from office, I claimed it publicly in the name of Jesus, & it happened, just as I said! See Mark 11:24
Think Tank Tutoring! - Hire Kung Fu Joe - the "Sherman Tank" of tutoring! All ages, most subjects
Spanish Teacher needs employment!!!
Jesus Christ & the Trustworthiness of the Bible
THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE ME A PAWN IN A RELIGIOUS POWER-GAME

PILLARS OF COMMUNITY TESTIFY OF MY GOOD CHARACTER
PICTURE PROOF | GOD HAS BACKED ME WITH POWER

SCANDAL DISGUISED AS COURT TRIAL: YOLO "JUDGE" GAARD CEDED POWER TO DEPUTY D.A.; UNJUST CAPTIVITY
CASE-BY-CASE COURT-DOCUMENTED PROOF VIOLATIVE ACTS OF DAVIS POLICE

COURT-DOCUMENTED PROOF OF CONSPIRACY OF YOLO D.A., POLICE, & OTHERS
CONSPIRATORIAL INVOLVEMENT OF YOLO JUDGES
PROOF OF YOLO SHERIFF INVOLVEMENT IN CONSPIRACY
AFFIDAVIT REPORTS TO FEDS OF CORRUPTION


When they kidnap you & hold you hostage for 2 years AFTER YOU PROVED YOUR INNOCENCE, & THEIR GUILT, IN COURTS OF LAW, if you don't take a prominently displayed hangman's gallows & cage seriously, YOU'RE DEAD!
Art display in Davis Commons in 2002-2003; gallows made of I-beams - subtle reference to I-beams of Twin Towers (9/11 attacks). The dozens of false arrests & kidnappings of me while spreading the Word of Christ had been facilitated by 9-1-1 phone calls to Davis police; the implications of 9/11 polarized the community, making me Public Enemy #1 (see Public Enemy #2 on Picture Proof page).



PLEASE DO YOUR DUTY TO DEFEAT THE NATIONAL CONSPIRACY & REBELLION! CALL THE AUTHORITIES BELOW

DEMAND THE REVOLUTION AGAINST CONSPIRATORS DEFYING THE US CONSTITUTION!

Pentagon, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey
703-697-9121

US Marines, Joint Forces Command: 757-203-5463
US Marines, Camp Pendleton: 760-725-5799
[email protected]

Paul McCartney

Prince Charles & Queen Elizabeth of England
[email protected]

US President (White House complaint line)
202-456-1414
[email protected]

Vice President
202-224-2424
Congressman John Garamendi
202-225-1880
Senator Barbara Boxer
202-224-3553
US DOJ
[email protected]
202-514-3204
FBI, Washington
[email protected]
202-324-3000



WANTED
FOR KIDNAP, CONSPIRACY, & CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER:


The Davis police (former chiefs Ruiz, Hyde; officers Chudomelka, Guerrero, Doroshov, & others);
Former d.a. Henderson, deputy d.a.'s Tzang, Akulian, & Parrish;
Yolo judges Mock, Johnson, White;
former leader of Belfrey Ministry Steve Simmons;

ALSO IMPLICATED IN THE CONSPIRACY ARE:
Davis mayor & town council members; leaders of University Covenant Church (see AFFIDAVIT REPORTS), Yolo sheriff Prieto; several officers of the UCD police; leaders of Davis Chinese Christian Church; Ca. DRE officials; Director of Yolobus; Doug Arnold of Coldwell Banker, others




I TESTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THERE IS A PLOT TO KILL ME IN YOLO COUNTY!
Executed in Davis Ca. on 12 Jan. 2009
/s/Joseph A. Sherman


I'm asking citizens to come forward & testify of the hatecrimes:
Please call me & sign a DECLARATION that:
(1)You eye-witnessed any of the unreasonable seizures of the Davis police, or,
(2)You have knowledge of the discriminatory practices/unreasonable seizures!





I WAS HELD HOSTAGE FOR MORE THAN 2 YEARS IN THE YOLO COUNTY JAIL WHEN EVERYONE KNOWS I'M INNOCENT & THERE WASN'T A SHRED OF EVIDENCE AGAINST ME, PURSUANT TO
YOLO COUNTY JUDGES JOINING CONSPIRACY AS OF 2003-2007. EVERYONE IN YOLO COUNTY KNOWS OF THE DAVIS POLICE/YOLO DA SCANDAL AGAINST ME, YET THEY ALLOWED ME TO BE HELD CAPTIVE & AS OF YET HAVE FAILED TO ARREST THE TERRORISTS WHO HELD ME HOSTAGE!!! MOREOVER, IT WAS MADE UNMISTAKEABLY CLEAR THAT THE 2 YEAR CAPTIVITY WAS A "TEST RUN;" NEXT THEY WOULD GO FOR THE DEATH PENALTY!

Justice POWER-O-RAMA INDEX
SELF-HELP CIVIL SUIT CENTER | 42 USC 1983 Caselaw protections re:
Free Speech, Unreasonable Seizures & False Arrests, Resisting Arrest, No Good Faith/No Qualified Immunity of Officers,
Equal Protection, Malicious Prosecution, Police Harassment & Custom, Conspiracy

PILLARS OF COMMUNITY TESTIFY OF SHERMAN'S GOOD CHARACTER
PICTURE PROOF | GOD HAS BACKED ME WITH POWER
AFFIDAVITS & PRESS RELEASE
CASE-BY-CASE COURT-DOCUMENTED PROOF VIOLATIVE ACTS OF DAVIS POLICE
VIOLATIONS OF MY RIGHTS BY YOLOBUS
PROOF OF YOLO SHERIFF INVOLVEMENT IN CONSPIRACY
COURT-DOCUMENTED PROOF OF CONSPIRACY OF YOLO D.A.
PROOF OF INVOLVEMENT OF YOLO COUNTY JUDGES IN CONSPIRACY
AFFIDAVIT REPORTS: PROOF OF CHURCH LEADERS INVOLVEMENT
Amendments
The fundamentality of free speech
Forums & limited regulation
The absolute sovereignty of free speech rights over State statutes
Civil protections in Ca.
Police violations & brutality
Legal resistance
Be bold!!!
Door to door peddling/soliciting is protected free speech activity


The Davis police are terrorists, & the local so-called leaders have condoned & affirmed their terrorism; I am requesting help from within & without the community! I have held my post, but alone I am no match for them (except that God is on my side), & their goal is murder. I was held captive for more than 2 years from Sept. 2004 - May 2007. They held me hotage as a direct result of 6 kangaroo court trials; Yolo css. 03-7477, 04-4128, 04-3910, 04-5635, & other css.
2 years ago my pastor referred to the Davis police as terrorists!

    Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal. 4th 468: The Ca. Constitution, Art. I sec. 2 provides more than a protection against infringement, it is a "grant of right!... Our California Constitution provides greater, not lesser, protection for this traditional form of free speech.... Second, article I's [Ca. Constitution] right to freedom of speech, unlike the First Amendment's [US Constitution], is unbounded in range. It runs against the world, including private parties as well as governmental actors.... 'Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects ....' (Cal. Const., art. I, ? 2, subd. (a),.."
    Re: Freedom of Speech, Federal Courts have ruled:

    "Annoyance & inconvenience is a small price to pay for our most precious right!"
    Carreras v. City of Anaheim (9th Cir 1985) 768 F. 2d 1039, 1046


    Yolo County's Axis of Evil: The Davis police & the Yolo County district attorney

    AWOL police of Davis
    Against the Wicked, Oppressive, & Lazy police of Davis;
    Davis police are terrorists, slanderers, & perjurors

    See AFFIDAVIT: Yolo County's Axis of Evil: Davis police & Yolo d.a. for specific details: The Davis, Ca. police have been kidnapping me for years, these kidnappings have occurred in a variety of locations & situations; from doing 100% legal & protected free speech evangelism to patronizing local businesses such as restaurants, coffee houses, stores, public malls & squares; they operate under a guise of law enforcement, usually duping members of the public to participate with them, to provide a semblance of legitimacy, but the fact is it is not only false arrest, they are committing kidnap, pursuant to Ca. P.C. 207! As a Christian & with Christian advice, I forgave & forgave, & foregave, without filing charges or bringing civil suit for damages, only filing complaints with City of Davis & complaining at all town council meetings, for 6 1/2 years, showing God's love so they could save face & repent. Perhaps I was "a fool for Christ" as the apostle Paul says, showing them unlimited patience, but now in prayer & through advice I have filed charges & filed civil monetary suit. The Bible says, "Do not give what is holy to dogs, and do not throw your pearls before swine, or they will trample them under their feet, and turn and tear you to pieces." These corrupt police made it clear they had no intention of obeying the laws or upholding justice; they were self-condemned, my acts of mercy were no more then extra chances for them to ruin me. I forgave them, but they couldn't forgive themselves! Jesus said: "I have given you authority to trample on snakes and scorpions and to overcome all the power of the enemy; nothing will harm you." These police & the corrupt Yolo County d.a. are behind bars in the name of Jesus.


    America's values:
    "Give me your tired, your poor,
    Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
    The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
    Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
    I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"



    The values of traitorous Davis police & Yolo County d.a.:
    "There was a deliberate attempt to administer poison, no single dose of which was lethal but with an accumulative effect inevitable and realized."
    Kenworthy v. State of California (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 378

    Acknowledged there have been more vile offenders, but they have proven their goal is without question the demise of the "poor...huddled masses...homeless, tempest-tost;" they have renounced & betrayed American & all we stand for:



    Rights & freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the California Constitution, & California Statutes

    TARGET STORE'S POLICY RESULTING IN SALVATION ARMY CEASING THEIR ACTIVITIES OF COLLECTING FOR THE POOR IN FRONT OF TARGET STORES WAS MISREPRESENTED BY THE MEDIA. TARGET & S.A. REACHED AN AGREEMENT THAT TARGET WOULD CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO S.A. FOR THE HOLIDAYS, AMOUNTS MORE THAN THEY ORDINARILY COLLECT FROM BELL RINGING. NEVERTHELESS, WHILE TARGET'S POLICY PROTESTING FREE SPEECH ACTIVITIES IS ANTI-AMERICAN, IT IS PROTECTED SPEECH, AS LONG AS THEY DON'T ATTEMPT TO ENFORCE THEIR POLICY BY COERCING POLICE TO VIOLATE ACTIVISTS' RIGHTS!

    Here's the truth:

    Young v. New York Transit Authority (2d Cir. 1990) 903 F.2d 146:

    "The Supreme Court's holding in Schaumburg rested on the reasoning that appeals by organized charities "involve a variety of speech interests" including "communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes." Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632. The Court continued that such 'solicitation?nbsp; ?nbsp; is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues,' Id.

    "Upon revisiting the charitable solicitation field in Munson, the Supreme Court quoted all of the above Schaumburg language as the basis for concluding that 'charitable solicitations are so intertwined with speech that they are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.' Munson, 467 U.S. at 959. In Riley, the Court reiterated that limitations preventing charitable organizations from raising contributions were 'unconstitutional under the force of Schaumburg.' Riley, 108 S. Ct. at 2673."

    Target's policy against free speech, including charitable organizations who solicit funds, is unconstitutional!

    Note:
    I went to Target store in Woodland on Monday, 18 April 2005, spoke with management re: Freespeech activities in front of the store; they said all such activities were against store policy, & they would take evasive action if I attempted to evangelize. I then proceeded to evangelize in front of the store. A Woodland police car arrived & an officer questioned me, I told him state statutes can't take precedence over the Constitution, much less a target store policy! (Ex Parte Blaney (1947) 184 P.2d 892, 30 C2d 643 "Where an entire statute in general terms infringes on the constitutional right of free speech, the statute will be stricken down in its entirety.") Just then another squad car arrived, & the officer went over to talk to the newly arrived officer; I recommenced evangelism. Finally the officer returned & said, "Mr. Sherman, we won't interfere with your free speech rights, just be sure to keep the entrances clear for traffic," as I was already doing.


    Constitutional Amendments

    US Constitution Amendment I
    "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

    US Constitution Amendment IV
    "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

    US Constitution Amendment V
    "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

    US Constitution Amendment XIV sec. 1
    "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

    The fundamentality of free speech

    Carreras v. City of Anaheim (9th Cir 1985)
    768 F. 2d 1039, 1046:
    Re: Freedom of Speech: "Annoyance & inconvenience is a small price to pay for the preservation of our most precious right!"


    Texas v. Johnson, U.S. Tex. (1989)
    109 S.Ct. 2533, 491 U.S. 367, 105 L.Ed.2d 342:
    "Principal function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute; it may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger"

    Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) 335 US 234:
    "...protections include speech that may offend the sensibilities."

    Bond v. Floyd, U.S. Ga (1966) 87 S. Ct. 339, 385 U.S. 116, 17 L.Ed.2d 235:
    "Central commitment of provisions of this [First] amendment forbidding abridgment of freedom of speech is that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, & wide open."

    Hispanic Educ. Committee v. Houston Independent School Dist.,S.D. Tex. (1994) 886 F. Supp. 606, affirmed 68 F.3d 467:
    "Right of free expression is immunity from verbal repression, anticipatory or retaliatory...Free speech allows people to retaliate, the very thing government may not do."

    New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, U.S. Ala. (1964) 84 S.Ct. 710, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, motion denied 84 S.Ct. 1130, 376 U.S. 967, 12 L.Ed.2d 83:
    "The constitutional protections for free speech & press were fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for bringing about political & social changes desired by the people."

    Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, U.S.Dist.Col. (1969) 89 S.Ct. 1794, 395 U.S. 367, 23 L.Ed.2d 371:
    "It is purpose of this amendment to preserve uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of the market, whether it be by government itself, or by private licensee."

    Iota XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University E.D.Va. (1991) 773 F.Supp. 792, affirmed 993 F.2d 386:
    "One of the fundamental rights secured by First Amendment is that of free, uncensored expression, even on matters some may think are trivial, vulgar, or profane."

    Forums & limited regulation

    Bryant v. Secretary of Army, D.D.C.(1994) 862 F.Supp. 574:
    "Three types of fora for the purposes of First Amendment analysis are traditional public forum, limited public forum, & nonpublic forum."

    Demmon v. Loudoun County Public Schools E.D.Va. (2003) 279 F.Supp.2d 689:
    "Where an area is intentionally opened for indiscriminate public use for expressive activity, it becomes a designated public forum for purposes of the Free Speech Clause...In designated public forums, the owner may regulate the expression therein under the First Amendment only to extent permissible...reasonable time, place, & manner restrictions are permissible, whereas content-based restrictions must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest."

    T.A.G. Bicentennial Committee v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation, D.C.R.I.(1976) 417 F.Supp. 632:
    "Once a situs is designated public forum, government has no power to restrict expression because of message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content; nevertheless, reasonable regulations controlling time, place, & manner of expression in public forum are permissible."

    Diener v. Reed, M.D. Pa. (2002) 232 F.Supp.2d 362:
    "Traditional public forum cannot be converted into a limited public forum by an ipse dixit [delaring it themselves] pronouncement simply by declaring it to be so, on free speech challenge."

    Good News Club v. Milford Central School, U.S. (2001), 121 S.Ct. 2093, 533 U.S. 98, 150 L.Ed.2d 151:
    "When the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is not required to & does not allow persons to engage in every type of speech, & may be justified in reserving its forum for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics, but the restriction must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint, & must be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum."
    School district that had opened its building for public use after school for reservation for purposes of eduction, arts, civic & social venues was prohibited from denying access for reservation by a religious group.

    Trinity United Methodist Parish v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of newburgh, S.D.N.Y. (1995) 907 F.Supp. 707:
    "'limited public forum' is created when government opens nonpublic forum but limits expressive activity to certain kinds of speakers or to discussion of certain subjects."

    U.S. v. Boessewetter D.C.D.C. (1978) 463 F.Supp. 370:
    "Having permitted such activities such as sale of souvenier programs & other commemorative items to take place in semipublic portions of Kennedy Center, the government could not attempt to impose absolute ban on religious activities, even if regulations focused more particularly on time, place, & manner of distribution of material could be lawfully promulgated." See also Air Line Pilots Ass'n International v. Dept. of Aviation of City of Chicago, C.A.(Ill.) (1995), 45 F.3d 1144.


    Examples of limited public fora:

    School auditorium available for reservation (for free of for rent) for public events; public or private buildings, conference halls, etc. that are available to the public for reservation; these must not discriminate, Trinity United Methodist Parish, Good News Club (supra). Public meetings are also considered a limited public forum in that gov't moderator must allow freedom of expression of opposing & differing views, but may limit such speech to the specific topic at hand, Good News Club.

    People v. Medrano (1978 3rd App. Dist.) 78 Cal.App.3d 198:

    "A determination of whether the right of freedom of speech encompasses the right to enter onto private property and to communicate with audiences on the property, despite the owner's objection, involves a balancing of the free speech right with the owner's property right. The owner's exclusionary right receives less weight when the property assumes to some significant degree the functional attributes of public property devoted to a public use. The free speech right receives greater weight when the entrant and owner-invited audience share a relationship engendering a common interest in the message, and less weight when the entrant can reach the audience through adequate, alternative channels of communication."

    Union organizers were not trespassing by entering farm labor camp for purposes of notifying tenants of upcoming election; farm labor tenants had little other means of communication with outside world, & labor camp owner's policy had allowed limited public access for social & business. Court also ruled: "Pen. Code 602, subd. (n) [now 602(o)], which defines one variety of trespass as a refusal to leave private property upon request, requires two separate requests to leave the premises, one from a peace officer and another from the property possessor...The requirement of two requests impels the property possessor to summon the authorities; it discourages violent confrontations which might occur in the absence of a peace officer. The duality of requests is thus an essential element of the offense," Medrano,"




    The absolute sovereignty of free speech rights over State statutes

    Ex Parte Blaney (1947) 184 P.2d 892, 30 C2d 643 "Where an entire statute in general terms infringes on the constitutional right of free speech, the statute will be stricken down in its entirety."


    Carreras v. City of Anaheim (9th Cir 1985)
    768 F. 2d 1039, 1046:
    Re: Freedom of Speech: "Annoyance & inconvenience is a small price to pay for the preservation of our most precious right!"

    Hamburg v. Walmart Stores, Inc. (App. 1 Dist. 2004) 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 568, 116 Cal.App. 4th 497, as modified; [Below is a detailed quote of a large part of the Hamburg decision]:

    "The protestors had been collecting signatures on petitions to qualify a voter initiative and carrying signs bearing messages such as "Free speech" on a median approximately 25 feet from the store's entrance and on the sidewalk along the front of the store. They did not use the four-by-six area designated by the store for expressive activities....the reasonableness of the store's time, place, and manner restrictions and the protestors' refusal to be bound by them did not establish that the protestors committed the crime (Pen. Code 602.1, subd. (a)) for which they were placed under citizen's arrest. A protestor who refuses to comply with reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions can, in appropriate circumstances, be enjoined by the landowner [restrained by court order] from carrying out expressive activities...but the refusal to comply does not constitute misdemeanor trespass under 602.1, subd. (a), unless it consists of intentional interference with the landowner's business through the obstruction or intimidation of its customers...Moreover, since the arrests, which were central to both claims made by the protestors, were made by the store manager, a private citizen, it was necessary that the offenses have been committed in the manager's presence. (Pen. Code 837, subd. 1.) The court held that it was not necessary to determine whether the protestors actually committed the trespasses for which they were arrested, because the store manager did not assert or imply that the acts for which he arrested them were committed in his presence...


    "(3) Trespass 2--Misdemeanor--Definitions and Distinctions--Intentional Interference With Business Establishment.--Pen. Code 602.1, subd. (a), makes it a misdemeanor to intentionally interfere with a lawful business establishment open to the public, by obstructing or intimidating those attempting to carry on business at the establishment and refusing to leave the premises after being requested to do so.

    "(4) Trespass 5--Misdemeanor Trespass--Acts Constituting Crimes--Violation of Time, Place and Manner Restrictions.--A person who [*499]?nbsp; refuses to consider him- or herself bound by "time, place and manner" restrictions on public protest, or who violates one or more particular restriction, does not necessarily commit the criminal offense defined by Pen. Code 602.1, subd. (a). A protestor who refuses to comply with reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions can, in appropriate circumstances, be enjoined by the landowner from carrying out expressive activities, or even ejected from the premises; but the refusal to comply does not constitute misdemeanor trespass unless it consists of intentional interference with the landowner's business through the obstruction or intimidation of its customers.

    "(5) Arrest 31--Arrest Without Warrant--Misdemeanor--Arrest by Private Person--Presence.--A private citizen may arrest another for a misdemeanor only when the offense has actually been committed or attempted in his or her presence. (Pen. Code 837, subd. 1.) The mere fact that the private person has reasonable cause to believe a misdemeanor offense has been committed or attempted in his or her presence is not enough. "Presence" is not mere physical proximity but is determined by whether the offense is apparent to the senses of the person who makes the arrest.

    "(6) Arrest 31--Arrest Without Warrant--Generally--Arrest by Private Person--Presence--Good Faith Belief.--A store manager's declaration that did not assert or even imply that the acts for which he arrested protestors were committed in his presence and his claim that he acted in the good faith belief that the protestors were trespassing based on his discussions with police officers and, inferentially, customer complaints, was not a sufficient basis for a citizen arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor."

    "...the evidence respondents submitted in support of their motion for summary judgment establishes that the offense (if there was one) was not committed or attempted in Estes's [Walmart manager who committed false arrest]?nbsp;presence."
    "The evidence submitted by respondents in support of the motion for summary judgment consisted exclusively of limited portions of the deposition [*505]?nbsp; testimony of each of the eight appellants, n3 appellant Hamburg's responses to form interrogatories, and the declaration of respondent Estes. Estes's declaration was accompanied by a copy of the incident report of the Ukiah Police, copies of three complaints Wal-Mart received from customers regarding appellants' activities, and a copy of Wal-Mart's "Rules [***13]?nbsp; and Regulations for Petitioning and Soliciting from Wal-Mart California Property...

    "All appellants except David Drell, who was a coordinator of the protest, admitted they made no effort to identify themselves in advance to Wal-Mart management...

    "Appellants' confined most of their activities to a landscaped median approximately 25 feet from the front entrance to the store and the sidewalk along the front of the store. They did not use the four-by-six-foot area designated by Wal-Mart for expressive activities because that space was being used by two individuals soliciting donations to a children's program...

    "First, petitioning and soliciting is only permitted 'in designated areas specified by Wal-Mart.'

    "(3) The reasonableness of Wal-Mart's "time, place and manner" restrictions and respondents' refusal to be bound by them do not, however, establish that appellants committed the crime for which they were placed under citizen's arrest, which is defined in section 602.1, subdivision (a) of the Penal Code. As noted (ante, at p. 507, fn. 4), that statute makes it a misdemeanor to intentionally interfere with a lawful business establishment open to the public, "by obstructing or intimidating those attempting to carry on business" at the establishment and refusing to leave the premises after being requested to do so.

    "(4) A person who refuses to consider her or himself bound by "time, [***24] place and manner" restrictions, or who violates one or more particular restriction, does not necessarily commit the criminal offense defined by Penal Code section 602.1, subdivision (a). As we have seen, Wal-Mart's "time, place and manner" rules include one restriction (prohibiting efforts to "impede, obstruct or interfere with any customer of the store") that is conterminous with the prohibition of that statute, as well as other restrictions, such as the requirement of insurance coverage, that are not...

    "the refusal to comply does not constitute misdemeanor trespass unless it consists of intentional interference with the landowner's business through the obstruction or intimidation of its customers...The constitutionality of the rules does not govern the lawfulness of the arrests.

    "The only evidence respondents provided relating to these questions was the declaration of Estes, the store manager, and the three written customer complaints he gave the police, earlier described. Estes does not declare that he observed appellants, or any of them, obstructing or intimidating any Wal-Mart customer, but merely that, at the time of the incident, the store had received "numerous" complaints from customers and employees "concerning aggressive and harassing conduct by [appellants] and others in their group." The customers whose complaints have been made a part of the record indicated only that they were offended by appellants' conduct. One complainant stated that she was "not happy [with] the way [the protestors] approach people," but no customer indicated that he or she?nbsp;[***28] had been obstructed from carrying on business with Wal-Mart or intimidated, or even that appellants attempted to prevent them from shopping at Wal-Mart. [*511]

    "In In re Wallace (1970) 3 Cal.3d 289 [90 Cal. Rptr. 176, 475 P.2d 208], petitioners for habeas corpus had been arrested for allegedly obstructing a county fair by handing out leaflets protesting the effects on farm workers of automation of agriculture. After trial, the petitioners were found guilty of trespass in violation of Penal Code section 602, subdivision (j), making punishable the entry of lands with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or injuring any lawful business of the landowner. The Supreme Court granted writ relief for the failure of the evidence to establish that the petitioners' leafleting activity constituted "obstruction" within the meaning of the statute. The evidence in Wallace showed that the petitioners stood in a pathway " 'stopping patrons and soliciting them,' " but that patrons who wished to inspect the exhibit at which petitioners were conducting their activity could do so " 'by avoiding the area where [petitioners] were standing.' " ( Id. at p. 294.) [***29] The court found the evidence insufficient, pointing out that "any visitor to a fair or other public exhibition necessarily occupies a certain area of ground or floor [**580] space wherever he stands, and persons wishing to proceed past him are manifestly required to 'avoid' that area under pain of tort liability ... .[P]etitioners were not in fact arrested because of any physical 'obstruction' they may have caused, but simply because they insisted on their lawful right to distribute leaflets and to display signs." ( Id. at p. 295.) This appears also to have been the case here.

    "(5) Furthermore, it is not even necessary to determine whether appellants committed the trespass for which they were arrested if the offenses (assuming they took place) were not "committed or attempted" in the presence of the private person who arrested them. "The authority of a private citizen to make an arrest is more limited than that of a peace officer. A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant whenever he has probable cause to believe that the person has committed a misdemeanor in his presence. [Citation.] A private citizen, however, may arrest another for a misdemeanor only when the offense has actually been committed or attempted in his presence. (Pen. Code 837, subd. 1.)" n7 ( Cervantez v. [**581]?nbsp; J.C. Penney Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 587 [156 Cal. Rptr. 198, 595 P.2d 975], italics added.) The mere fact that the private person has reasonable cause to?nbsp;[***32]?nbsp; believe a misdemeanor offense has been committed or attempted in his presence is not enough. ( People v. Martin (1964) 225 Cal. App. 2d 91, 94 [36 Cal. Rptr. 924]; Collins v. Owens (1947) 77 Cal. App. 2d 713, 718 [176 P.2d 372].) As this division has stated, "presence" is not mere physical proximity but is determined by whether the offense is "apparent to the senses" of the person who makes the arrest. ( People v. Sjosten, supra, 262 Cal. App. 2d at pp. 543-544.)"

    Hamburg makes it clear, time, place, & manner restrictions, such as location in front of store where activities are allowed, req. of advance notice, etc., if reasonable, as the US Constitutional case law req's, ethically should be respected, but violation of such restrictions does not amount to violation of the law, such as PC 602.1(a) (interference with business). Additionally, mere complaints by customers, in & of themselves, no matter how many or how few, cannot be the basis of interference with business allegations; first of all, stopping or approaching or speaking to customers as they pass by, absent any blocking or interfering with their ingress or egress, etc., far from being interference with business, is the very heart & soul of the rights free speech protects; if everyone agreed on every single issue, there would be no need for free speech; therefore complaints that such activities are occurring are prima facie void; second of all, a customer complaint that consists of allegations amounting to intereference with business still isn't enough for a manager or owner, etc., who hasn't personally witnessed such violation, to make a citizens arrest or file charges of interference with business; according to Hamburg, the manager, etc. making the citizen's arrest must have personally witness the alleged violation.

    Hague v. C.I.O (1939) 307 U.S. 496, 515, in many cities the public areas of the shopping mall are replacing the streets and sidewalks of the central business district which, "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and...have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."

    Fashion Valley Mall v. National Labor Relations Board (2007) S144735, "It has been the law since we decided Schwartz-Torrance in 1964, and remains the law, that a privately owned shopping center must permit peaceful picketing of businesses in shopping centers, even though such picketing may harm the shopping center's business interests." See also Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U.S. 88, 104-105. In Fashion Valley, the mall attempted to prohibit a peaceful boycott of customers by activists because it was contrary to mall's interests & "interfered with business;" violating their policies. "...a content-based speech restriction must be 'necessary to serve a compelling state interest, and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end,' (Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland (1987) 481 U.S. 221, 231.)...The Mall's purpose to maximize the profits of its merchants is not compelling compared to the Union's right to free expression...Urging customers to boycott a store lies at the core of the right to free speech."



    People v. Wilkinson (1967) 56 Cal.Rptr 261 "It is not a violation of Penal Code section making entry & occupying of real property or structures without consent a misdemeanor to enter without consent unless entry is followed by occupation without consent, nor is it a violation to occupy without consent if entry is made with consent." "One may violate statutory provision [602(m)]...by entry & occupation of unfenced & unposted land."

    This case is dealing with an alleged violation of 602(m) of Ca. penal code [formerly 602(l)], trespassing & can be readily found in West's Annotated Code. This case involved men who went to Big Sur to camp, but camp was filled, so they went next door to private property called Little Sur, climbed a fence near the beach, & harmlessly built a campsite with campfire to camp overnight & leave the next day. The next morning they were arrested for trespassing. Appeal court showed they did not commit trespass.

    P.C. 602(m)"Entering & occupying real property or structures of any kind without consent of owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession."
    Court showed that defendants staying over night was too transient to be considered to be the intent of "occupying" the property of the statute, & therefore trial court findings were reversed, defendants declared innocent. A grocery store is a business open to the public; a grocery store & any business open to the public has by definition given consent to the general public to enter. That's why you don't have to knock on a grocery store's front door before going in. According to above court ruling, it is not a violation to occupy without consent if a person has entered with consent. A private business open to the public has given people consent to come on their property & come in their store, & cannot retroactively terminate consent & arrest an individual for trespassing.

    Commonly asserted, but equally as impotent as 602(m) against free speech & freedom of assembly rights is P.C. 602.1, "interference with business:"

    Ca. P.C. 602.1 (a),(b)
    "(a) Any person who intentionally interferes with any lawful business or occupation carried on by the owner or agent of a business establishment open to the public, by obstructing or intimidating those attempting to carry on business, or their customers, & who refuses to leave the premises of the business establishment after being requested to leave by the owner or owner's agent, or by a peace officer acting at the request of the owner or owner's agent, is guilty of a misdemeanor...
    (b) Any person who intentionally interferes with any lawful business carried on by the employees of a public agency open to the public, by obstructing or intimidating those attempting to carry on business, or those persons there to transact business with the public agency, & who refuses to leave the premises of the public agency after being requested to leave by the office manager or supervisor of the public agency, or by a peace officer acting at the request of the office manager or supervisor of the public agency, is guilty of a misdemeanor...
    (c) This section shall not apply to any of the following persons:
    (1) Any person engaged in lawful labor union activities that are permitted to be carried out on the property by state or federal law.
    (2) Any person on the premises who is engaging in activities protected by the California Constitution or the United States Constitution.
    (d) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to supersede the application of any other law."

    Subdivisions (c) & (d) qualify the entire 602.1 section, demonstrating prima facie the sovereignty of Blaney, Wilkinson, & the cases below over these statutes.


    People v. Brown (1965) 47 Cal.Rptr.662 (Dealing again with PC602(l))
    "Trespass statute making it a misdemeanor to willfully commit trespass ...does not make occupation without consent of owner after original entry by permission criminal." "Trespass statute making it a misdemeanor to willfully commit trespass by entering & occupying realty or structures without consent of owner did not give bank right to terminate retroactively consent originally given defendants to enter & thus make their acts a crime."

    Convictions were reversed. This bank was a private business open to the general public, giving the public consent to enter, therefore according to this & other consistent rulings of the court, the trespass statute cannot be applied here. A business such as a grocery store open to the public cannot arrest someone for trespassing during business hours; its against the law & in violation of the public's rights. There is an obvious reason for this: If a private business owner or manager of a private business open to the public could arrest someone for nothing more than trespassing during business hours, this would be a tool too easily used for prejudice & oppression of free speech & free assembly rights; in fact there really would not be any legitimate reason to attempt a trespass arrest on property open to the public. This clear legal limitation of the application of trespass laws is a necessary means of protecting of our rights.

    Free speech includes right to be left alone by police

    People v. Howard (1980) 50 N.Y.2d 583, An individual to whom a police officer addresses a question has a constitutional right not to respond. He may remain silent or walk or run away. His refusal to answer is not a crime. Though the police officer may endeavor to complete the interrogation, he may not pursue, absent probable cause to believe that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, seize or search the individual or his possessions, even though he runs away...The privacy interest of citizens is far too cherished a right to be entrusted to the discretion of the officer in the field. That privacy interest is protected by the mandate of U.S. Const. amend. IV...Where police officers have no information that a crime has occurred or is about to take place, have not seen a defendant do anything criminal, and are confronted only by facts susceptible of innocent interpretation, there may be a basis for questioning the defendant, but there is nothing that permits any greater level of intrusion...While the police may have the right to make an inquiry, a defendant has a constitutional right not to respond. This is so both because U.S. Const. amend. V and N.Y. Const. art. I, 6, permit him to remain silent and because U.S. Const. amend. IV and N.Y. Const. art. I, 12, protect him from detention amounting to seizure unless there is probable cause. A defendant has the right to be let alone...The failure to stop or co-operate by identifying oneself or answering questions cannot be the predicate for an arrest absent other circumstances constituting probable cause. This is because the failure to answer cannot constitute a criminal act. That does not mean that the police in furtherance of their duties may not continue observation provided that they do so unobtrusively and do not limit a defendant's freedom of movement by so doing. A defendant's flight, if there is also indicia of criminal activity, would be an important factor in determining probable cause, but where there is nothing to establish that a crime has been or is being committed, flight, like refusal to answer, is an insufficient basis for seizure or for the limited detention that is involved in pursuit

    Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47, "The application of [state law] to detain appellant and require him to identify himself violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct. Accordingly, appellant may not be punished for refusing to identify himself, and the conviction is Reversed."

    Courts have concurred with these landmark cases:

    Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. (1987) 482 US 569:
    Talking is sovereign!!! There is no legitimate government interest for prohibiting talking in a public forum (area open to the public) or even in a nonpublic forum! An area open to the public that attempts to limit or prohibit talking violates the US Constitution on its face:
    "On its face, the resolution at issue in this case reaches the universe of expressive activity, and, by prohibiting all protected expression, purports to create a virtual "First Amendment Free Zone" at LAX. The resolution does not merely regulate expressive activity in the Central Terminal Area that might create problems such as congestion or the disruption of the activities of those who use LAX. Instead, the resolution expansively states that LAX "is not open for First Amendment activities by any individual and/or entity," and that "any individual and/or entity [who] seeks to engage in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area . . . shall be deemed to be acting in contravention of the stated policy of the Board of Airport Commissioners." App. 4a-5a. The resolution therefore does not merely reach the?nbsp;
    activity of respondents at LAX; it prohibits even talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing. Under such a sweeping ban, virtually every individual who enters LAX may be found to violate the resolution by engaging in some "First Amendment activit[y]." We think it obvious that such a ban cannot be justified even if LAX were a nonpublic forum because no conceivable governmental interest would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech."

    Bank of Stockton v. Church of Soldiers (1996) 44 Cal.App. 4th 1623
    "Only when a forum is public, which in California includes shopping centers & supermarket-type stores,must a private owner show interference with the operations of the business in order to prohibit free speech activities."

    Allred v. Shawly (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1489
    "When a business establishment invites the public generally to patronize its store & in doing so to traverse a sidewalk opened for access the fact of private ownership of the sidewalk does not operate to strip the members of the public of their rights to exercise privileges under U.S. Const. 1st Amend., on the sidewalk at or near the place of entry to the establishment. In utilizing the sidewalk for such purposes those seeking to exercise such rights may not do so in a manner to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to or from the premises."

    Huffman & Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, Or. (1993) 857 P.2d 101, 317 Ar.445, Wolin v. Port of New York Authority SDNY (1967) 268 F. Supp. 855, affirmed 392 F.2d 83, cert. denied 89 S.Ct. 290, 393 U.S. 940, 21 L.Ed.2d 275:
    "Dedication of property to public use in effect dedicates it to exercise by public of constitutional rights, including rights of free speech, & assembly."

    Bonner-Lyons v. School Committee of City of Boston, C.A. Mass. (1973) 480 F.2d 442
    "Once a forum is open for expression of views, regardless of how unusual the forum, under the mandate of this amendment & equal protection clause, Amendment 14 section 1, neither gov't nor private censor may pick & choose between those views which may or may not be expressed."

    Westside Sane/Freeze v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc.(App 2 Dist. 1990) 274 Cal.Rptr.51, 224 Cal.App.3d 546
    "Free speech rights within shopping center, recognized by the State Constitution, are not limited to activities involving solicitation of signatures to petitions, but extend to other exercises of free speech & petition."

    In re Ball (1972) 23 C.A.3d 380, 100 Cal.Rptr. 189
    "Thus the ultimate issue in this case is not whether Disneyland may prohibit all First Amendment activities on its property, nor even whether the state may do so. The issue is whether the state may enforce a penal statute making it a misdemeanor to enter private property with the intention of interfering with or obstructing the lawful business of the occupant. There is no question but that it can..." There must be proof of interference with business; interference with business is controlling issue, not entry by paying a fare or fee (p.387), "It is unnecessary therefore to consider whether Disneyland's parking lot may be distinguished from the private properties involved in the cases relied upon by petitioner on the basis that payment of a fee was required for entrance or whether petitioner's activities in soliciting funds may be distinguished from the activities involved in those cases," p. 387. Free speech activities are protected in an area open to the public upon paying a fee, but activities neverthless must not interfere with business!

    Willowbrook v. Olech (2000) 120 S. Ct. 1073,
    Demonstrates that violation of equal protection rights of an individual is self-manifesting; a rational basis, such as race or religion, isn't necessary where discrimination is evident. Discrimination can occur to an individuals party, being a "class of one."

    Is occupying considered injury of property rights or interference with business?

    P.C.602(k) [Formerly 602(j)] "Entering lands, whether unenclosed or enclosed by fence, for the purpose of injuring any property or property rights or with the intention of interfering with, obstructing, or injuring any lawful business or occupation carried on by the owner of the land, the owner's agent, or by the person in lawful possession."


    People v. Sweetser (App. 5 Dist. 1977) 140 Cal.Rptr. 82 72 Cal.App.3d 278:
    "Under this section [602(k)], it is not sufficient merely to show that the accused wilfully entered upon the fenced lands of another without written permission & then refused to leave the land when requested to do so; it is also incumbent to prove that the accused's presence on the land constituted a trespass in the sense that he invaded another's exclusive right of possession."

    For possession to be considered violation of PC 602(k), it must be occupying usually in the sense of as a hostile claim of title, as in adverse possession, which would constitute invasion "of another's exclusive right of possession."?nbsp; See People v. Lapcheske (App. 4 Dist. 1999), 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 565, 73 Cal.App.4th 571; an adverse possessor is one who occupies under color of right of title, i.e., to acquire actual title ownership to the property through open, hostile occupying for 5 years continuously.


    In re Ball (App. 4 Dist. 1972) 100 Cal.Rptr. 189, 23 Cal.App.3d 380:
    "Property rights' within statute prohibiting entering lands for purpose of injury property rights means property rights consistent with First Amendment (U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1)"


    In re Wallace (1970) 90 Cal.Rptr. 176, 3 Cal.3d 289, 475 P2d 208:
    "Absent evidence of obstruction, this section [P.C. 602(j)] did not prohibit defendants from handing out leaflets & stopping & engaging in discussion with members of crowd on fairgrounds..."

    In re Bacon (App. 1 Dist. 1966)
    602(o) punishing trespass for failure to leave a public building after closing time, "does not deprive those charged with violation thereof of their rights of free speech, assembly, & redress of grievances." Students remained in public (university) building after hours, continuing a "sit-in" they had started as legitimate business during open hours to protest grievances. Building hours were posted, & an announcement was made over the intercom that the building was closed & patrons needed to exit. Standard is that of a reasonable man re: Legitimate business in a building that is closed; reasonably legitimate business terminates upon closure or very soon after. Court found constitutional rights were inapplicable once building had closed.


    Re: Property not open to public combined with direct request to leave, compliance is a "must" if requested by both owner & peace officer

    P.C. 602(o) "Refusing to leave land, real property, or structures belonging to or lawfully occupied by another & not open to the general public, upon being requested to leave by (1) a peace officer at the request of the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession, & upon being informed by the peace officer that he or she is acting at the request of the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession, or (2) the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession..."

    "Pen. Code 602, subd. (n) [now 602(o)], which defines one variety of trespass as a refusal to leave private property upon request, requires two separate requests to leave the premises, one from a peace officer and another from the property possessor...The requirement of two requests impels the property possessor to summon the authorities; it discourages violent confrontations which might occur in the absence of a peace officer. The duality of requests is thus an essential element of the offense," People v. Medrano (1978 3rd App. Dist.) 78 Cal.App.3d 198


    California has long been at the forefront of Freedom of Speech rights:
    More Constitution & State decisions


    Carreras v. City of Anaheim (9th Cir 1985) 768 F. 2d 1039, 1046:
    Re: Freedom of Speech: "Annoyance & inconvenience is a small price to pay for our most precious right!"

    Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal. 4th 468:
    The Ca. Constitution, Art. I sec. 2 provides more than a protection against infringement, it is an "explicit grant of right!...Our California Constitution provides greater, not lesser, protection for this traditional form of free speech."

    Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. (1985) 482 US 569:
    Talking is sovereign!!! There is no legitimate government interest for prohibiting talking in a public forum (area open to the public) or even in a nonpublic forum! An area open to the public that attempts to limit or prohibit talking violates the US Constitution on its face:
    "Because we conclude that the resolution is facially unconstitutional under the the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine regardless of the proper standard, we need not decide whether LAX is indeed a public forum, or whether the Perry standard is applicable when access to a nonpublic forum is not restricted...On its face, the resolution at issue in this case reaches the universe of expressive activity, and, by prohibiting all protected expression, purports to create a virtual "First Amendment Free Zone" at LAX. The resolution does not merely regulate expressive activity in the Central Terminal Area that might create problems such as congestion or the disruption of the activities of those who use LAX. Instead, the resolution expansively states that LAX "is not open for First Amendment activities by any individual and/or entity," and that "any individual and/or entity [who] seeks to engage in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area . . . shall be deemed to be acting in contravention of the stated policy of the Board of Airport Commissioners." App. 4a-5a. The resolution therefore does not merely reach the?nbsp; activity of respondents at LAX; it prohibits even talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing. Under such a sweeping ban, virtually every individual who enters LAX may be found to violate the resolution by engaging in some "First Amendment activit[y]." We think it obvious that such a ban cannot be justified even if LAX were a nonpublic forum because no conceivable governmental interest would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech...The petitioners suggest that the resolution is not substantially overbroad because it is intended to reach only expressive activity unrelated to airport-related purposes. Such a limiting construction, however, is of little assistance in substantially reducing the overbreadth of the resolution. Much nondisruptive speech - such as the wearing of a T-shirt or button that contains a political message - may not be "airport related," but is still protected speech even in a nonpublic forum. See Cohen v. California,
    403 U.S. 15 (1971). Moreover, the vagueness of this suggested construction itself presents serious constitutional difficulty. The line between airport-related speech and nonairport-related speech is, at best, murky. The petitioners, for example, suggest that an individual who reads a newspaper or converses with a neighbor at LAX is engaged in permitted "airport-related" activity because reading or conversing permits the traveling public to "pass the time." Reply Brief for Petitioners 12. We presume, however, that petitioners would not so categorize the activities of a member of a religious or political organization who decides to "pass the time" by distributing leaflets to fellow travelers. In essence, the result of this vague limiting construction would be to give LAX officials alone the power to decide in the first instance whether a given activity is airport related. Such a law that "confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation" of the resolution is unconstitutional because "[t]he opportunity for abuse, especially where a statute has received a virtually open-ended interpretation, is self-evident." Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 -136 (1974) (POWELL, J., concurring); see also Houston v. Hill, ante, at 465; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)."


    Savage v. Trammell Crow Co. (App. 4 Dist. 1990) 273 Cal.Rptr. 302, 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, rehearing denied & modified, review denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 1685, 500 U.S. 906, 114 L.Ed.2d 80
    "Public's right under this section to engage in expressive activity at private shopping center does not depend upon whether expressive activity is of political or religious nature."

    In re Lundgren (1987) 236 Cal.Rptr. 307 (Cal.App. 4Dist. 1987)
    Property open to the public is excluded from Ca. PC602(n)

    Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980) 100 S.Ct. 2035 Quoted & relied upon Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza (1968) 88 S.Ct., at 1609
    "this court held that the First & Fourteenth Amendments prevented a state court from relying on its law of trespass to enjoin the peaceful picketing of a business enterprise located within a shopping center. The court concluded that because the shopping center...is open to the general public, 'the State may not delegate the power, through the use of trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises.' Id., at 319, 88 S.Ct., at 1609." "In light of these realities we concluded that the First & Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the State from using its trespass laws to prevent the exercise of expressive activities on privately owned shopping centers..."

    Also re-affirming the above Logan Valley ruling:
    23 Cal.3d 899, 910, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 860, 592 P.2d 341, 347 (1979)
    "The California court concluded that its State Constitution broadly proclaims speech and petition rights. Shopping centers to which the public is invited can provide an essential & invaluable forum for exercising those rights.'" This case & others more recent affirming cases take precedent. United States Constitution Amendment 1, West's USCA.

    The courts have recently only made stronger rulings regarding their upholding of free speech & free assembly rights: A private business open to the public cannot arrest someone for trespassing. If store owners or managers don't like certain people or certain views held by the public, they need to get used to it or get out of the retail business & possibly get counseling; they don't have what it takes to deal with the public. False arrest is against the law, & people who do so, including store owners & managers, as well as police, are law breakers & crooks!

    Civil protections in Ca.
    Note: Codes quoted below are "sudvision inclusive," see codes for complete sections

    P.C. 422.6(a): "No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States because of the other person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, gender, or sexual orientation, or because he or she perceives that the other person has one or more of those characteristics."


    P.C. 423: "This title shall be known and may be cited as the California Freedom of Access to Clinic and Church Entrances Act, or the California FACE Act.
    P.C.423.2: "Every person who, except a parent or guardian acting towards his or her minor child or ward, commits any of the following acts shall be subject to the punishment specified in Section 423.3.
    (b) By force, threat of force, or physical obstruction that is a crime of violence, intentionally injures, intimidates, interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate, or interfere with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious worship."



    Civ.Code 51(a): "This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
    (b) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
    (c) This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person that is conditioned or limited by law or that is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition."



    C.C. 51.5(a): "No business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against, boycott or blacklist, or refuse to buy from, contract with, sell to, or trade with any person in this state because of the race, creed, religion, color, national origin, sex, disability, or medical condition of the person or of the person's partners, members, stockholders, directors, officers, managers, superintendents, agents, employees, business associates, suppliers, or customers, because the person is perceived to have one or more of those characteristics, or because the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have, any of those characteristics.
    (b) As used in this section, "person" includes any person, firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, limited liability company, or company."



    C.C.51.7(a): "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, or position in a labor dispute, or because another person perceives them to have one or more of those characteristics. The identification in this subdivision of particular bases of discrimination is illustrative rather than restrictive."



    Civ. code 801: "The following land burdens, or servitudes upon land, may be attached to other land as incidents or appurtenances, and are then called easements:
    1. The right of pasture;
    2. The right of fishing;
    3. The right of taking game;
    4. The right-of-way;
    5. The right of taking water, wood, minerals, and other things;
    6. The right of transacting business upon land;
    7. The right of conducting lawful sports upon land;
    8. The right of receiving air, light, or heat from or over, or discharging the same upon or over land;
    9. The right of receiving water from or discharging the same upon land;
    10. The right of flooding land;
    11. The right of having water flow without diminution or disturbance of any kind;
    12. The right of using a wall as a party wall;
    13. The right of receiving more than natural support from adjacent land or things affixed thereto;
    14. The right of having the whole of a division fence maintained by a coterminous owner;
    15. The right of having public conveyances stopped, or of stopping the same on land;
    16. The right of a seat in church;
    17. The right of burial;
    18. The right of receiving sunlight upon or over land as specified in Section 801.5."

    C.C.52.1(a): "If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney may bring a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief in the name of the people of the State of California, in order to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured...
    (b) Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described in subdivision (a), may institute and prosecute in his or her own name and on his or her own behalf a civil action for damages, including, but not limited to, damages under Section 52, injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured.
    (c) An action brought pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) may be filed either in the superior court for the county in which the conduct complained of occurred or in the superior court for the county in which a person whose conduct complained of resides or has his or her place of business. An action brought by the Attorney General pursuant to subdivision (a) also may be filed in the superior court for any county wherein the Attorney General has an office, and in that case, the jurisdiction of the court shall extend throughout the state.
    (d) If a court issues a temporary restraining order or a preliminary or permanent injunction in an action brought pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b), ordering a defendant to refrain from conduct or activities, the order issued shall include the following statement: VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIME PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 422.9 OF THE PENAL CODE.
    "



    C.C.52.3(a): "No governmental authority, or agent of a governmental authority, or person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, shall engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers that deprives any person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States or by the Constitution or laws of California.
    (b) The Attorney General may bring a civil action in the name of the people to obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice of conduct specified in subdivision (a), whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of subdivision (a) has occurred."


    Police violations & brutality

    False arrest/false imprisonment is a major violation of US Constitution Fourth Amendment:

    US Constitution Amendment IV
    "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
    supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

    PC 236: "False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another."

    PC 237(a) Punishment for false imprisonment, up to 1 year in jail, when involving fraud, violence, menace, or deceit, up to 1 year in state prison.

    Ca. PC 836(a): "A peace officer may arrest a person in obedience to a warrant, or, pursuant to the authority granted to him or her by Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2, without a warrant, may arrest a person whenever any of the following circumstances occur:
    (1) The officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in the officer's presence.
    (2) The person arrested has committed a felony, although not in the officer's presence.
    (3) The officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony, in fact, has been committed."

    PC 836.3: "A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person who, while charged with or convicted of a misdemeanor,..."

    PC 837: "A private person may arrest another:
    1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
    2. When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
    3. When a felony has been in fact committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.

    Officer is not liable for refusing to participate in citizen's arrest that is absent reasonable cause:
    PC 142 making it a misdemeanor for an officer to willfully refuse to receive or arrest a person charged with a criminal offense does not apply to arrests made by private citizens (PC 837).

    PC 847(a): "A private person who has arrested another for the commission of a public offense must, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a magistrate, or deliver him or her to a peace officer.
    (b) There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer or federal criminal investigator or law enforcement officer described in subdivision (a) or (d) of Section 830.8, acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest under any of the following circumstances:
    (1) The arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.
    (2) The arrest was made pursuant to a charge made, upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the person to be arrested.
    (3) The arrest was made pursuant to the requirements of Section 142, 837, 838, or 839."


    People v. Curtis (1969) 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 450 P2d 33, 70 C2d 347
    "The United States Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that a 'stop & frisk' short of arrest is no 'petty indignity' but a major intrusion on one's freedom from unreasonable searches & seizures (Terry v. Ohio (1968) supra, 392 US 1, 16-17, 88 S.Ct. 1868.)... An arrest is a 'seizure' within the meaning of Fourth Amendment prohibiting unreasonable 'seizures' U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4...An arrest without a warrant or probable cause is 'unreasonable' within the purview of the Fourth Amendment.[See Terry]...An arrest is of greater consequence than to stop & frisk & must be more narrowly circumscribed lest an innocent error be inflated into a major disturbance."

    People v. Curtis (1969) 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, Terry v. Ohio (1968):
    "Rights of defendant are violated when he is arrested & detained a matter of days or hours without probable cause, USCA Constitutional Amendment 4"

    People v. Holguin (1956) 302 P.2d 635, 145 C.A.2d 520,
    "Defendant makes a prima facie case of unlawful arrest when he establishes that the arrest was made without a warrant, & the burden of proof then rests on the prosecution to show proper justification."

    U.S. v. Heisman C.A. Mo.(1974) 503 F.2d 1284
    "Warrantless arrest is per se illegal unless probable cause therefore exists at the time of arrest."

    Morrison v. U.S. C.A.Neb. (1974) 491 F2d 344,
    Probable cause is to be determined upon objective facts available to arresting officer at time of arrest; see also U.S. v. Heisman C.A.Mo. (1974) 503 F2d 1284.

    U.S. v. Weaver, C.A. Mass.(1973) 471 F2d 18 rehearing denied 472 F2d 1405;
    "Questions of probable cause for seizure has to be considered...in light of all circumstances involved."

    U.S. v. Clay C.A. Ill. (1974) 495 F2d 700, certiorari denied, 95 S.Ct. 207, 419 U.S. 937, 42 L.Ed.2d 164;
    "Neither rumor, report, or suspicion is adequate to support arrest without a warrant."

    U.S. v. Tramontana C.A.N.Y. (1972) 460 F2d 464;
    Nor is acting in good faith sufficient to support arrest without a warrant

    U.S. Ex. rel. Gonzales v. Follette C.A.N.Y. (1968) 397 F2d 232,
    Common sense must be applied, such as due diligence questioning of the accused & any available witnesses

    Schlook v. U.S.C.A.Mo. (1964) 337 F2d 563
    Probable cause must be resolved "from facts & circumstances of particular case."

    Lykken v. Vavreck D.C. Minn. (1973) 366 F.Supp. 585
    "Arrests which were undertaken not in furtherance of good faith law enforcement but for purpose of harassing...were illegal."

    U.S. v. Beck C.A. Ariz. (1979) 598 F.2d 1284
    "Warantless arrest is per se illegal unless probable cause therefore exists at the time of arrest."

    Maney v. Ratcliff D.C.Wis.(1975) 399 F.Supp. 760
    "A core concept of this Amendment [IV] is the right to be free from arbitrary & unreasonable interference by police...Repeated arrests without subsequent prosecution is a violation of this Amendment."

    U.S. v. Beck C.A.Ariz.(1979) 598 F.2d 497
    "Arrest, unsupported by probable cause, cannot be saved by redesignating it as an investigatory stop."

    US v. Armstrong (1996) 517 US 456, 464, 134 L.Ed.2d 687, 116 S.Ct. 1480; Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 C3d 286, 290, 124 CR 204; Yick v. Hopkins (1886) 118 US 356, 30 L.Ed. 220, 6 S.Ct. 1064
    "Deliberate discrimination by law enforcement officers is grounds for dismissal based on violation of right to equal protection;" known as "invidious discrimination," Murgia


    Willowbrook v. Olech (2000) 120 S. Ct. 1073
    Violation of equal protection rights of an individual is self-manifesting; a rational basis, such as race or religion, isn't necessary where discrimination is evident. Discrimination can occur to an individuals party, being a "class of one."

    People v. Agnew (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 107 P.2d 601
    "That accused did not lay hands on person arrested under citizen's arrest under section 837 or that accused did not expressly direct action of officers in detaining such person & causing him to be booked at police station did not preclude prosecution for "false imprisonment" since such detention was the natural consequence of accused announced arrest of such person & was clearly at accused implied request & direction."

    PC 836: "Lawful warrantless arrest requires that misdemeanor occur in citizen's presence," Johnson v. DMV (App. 1Dist. 1995) 43 Cal.Rptr. 2d 42, 36 Cal.App. 4th 1209, modified on denial of rehearing, review denied.


    Legal resistance


    People v. Moreno (1973) 108 Cal.Rptr. 338, 32 Cal.App. 3d Supp.9:
    "Defendant being arrested had the right to resist if the arrest was unlawful... Curtis squarely holds that if the arrest is unlawful there can be no conviction of Penal Code section 148 because the officer is not 'in the discharge of his duty'... the court discusses Penal Code section 834a and, relyig on evidence from the legislative hearings unequivocally stated it had no purpose or result of creating a new substantive crime of resisting an unlawful arrest;...United States v. Dentice (E.D. Wis.1968) 289 F.Supp.799, 'Statute making it a crime to resist an officer in the performance of his official duties [requires] that the officer in fact be acting in official capacity-i.e., pursuant to valid authority...'" Moreno.

    Ca. PC 834a "If a person has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is the duty of such person to refrain from using force or any weapon to resist such arrest."

    In re V. (1974)111 Cal.Rptr. 681, 517 P.2d 1145, 10 C.3d 676
    "It is no crime to nonviolently resist the unlawful action of police officers."

    People v. Curtis(1969) 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 450 P2d 33, 70 C2d 347:
    "The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that 'one cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an officer if the command is itself violative of the Constiution.' (Wright v. Georgia (1963) 373 US 284, 291-292, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 1245, 10 L.Ed.2d 349.)."

    People v. Munoz (1970)
    84 Cal.Rptr. 501, 4 C.A.3d 562:
    "Arrestee does not have priviledge to commit batteries on on peace officers who commit illegal arrest."

    Ca. PC 834a "If a person has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is the duty of such person to refrain from using force or any weapon to resist such arrest."

    Ca. Pc 692 "Lawful resistance to the commission of a public offense may be made: 1. By the party about to be injured; 2. By other parties"

    People v. Curtis (1969) 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 450 P2d 33, 70 C2d 347;
    Resisting unlawful arrest (by force currently not allowed according to Ca. courts)

    People v. Perry (1947) 180 P2d 465, 29 C.A. Supp. 906 693:
    "If arrest is unlawful, person being arrested or others acting in his behalf may resist arrest, using no more than reasonable force for that purpose." Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured: 1. To prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof. 2. To prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession.

    People v. Chambers (1937) 72 P2d 746, 22 C.A.2d 687:
    Reasonable person standard, self defense

    Ca. PC 694. Any other person, in aid or defense of the person about to be injured, may make resistance sufficient to prevent the offense.

    Be bold!!!

    If a false arrest occurs while you are legally exercising your constitutional rights, can the police &/or owner/manager of the business or shopping center legally take away your right to return to the location of arrest using threat of arrest if you return (either before or after trial)? No!!! Ca. Penal Code 602, Ca. Constitution, & US Constitution forbid depriving a citizen of his rights anywhere, whether or not they have been arrested at the particular location (even if the individual committed a crime when arrested)! The only way in the US for someone to legally be threatened with arrest for going to a property open to the public during business hours is for the owner/manager to go to civil court & obtain a harassment restraining order, & they must prove in a court of law the occurence of repeated illegal activity by the accused (see CCP 527.6). The only exception to this is Ca. PC 602(s) where an individual has been convicted of a violent felony, & the felony must have occurred on that property. God has placed evangelists & others wishing to exercise free speech rights in a very broad place in this country.

    The Founding Fathers of America stood up for their God-given rights, resisting their wicked oppressors, suffering for & fighting for the freedoms we have today. "Resist the devil & he shall flee from you," (Jas 4:7); we must stand up for our rights & resist crooked police or others that would attempt to deprive us of our rights & freedoms!

    "My dear children, let us not love in word or in tongue, but in deed & in truth," the Bible says in 1 Jn 3:18. Peaceful evangelism in a public place is perfectly legal, but people will make false claims because they don't want Christians talking to people about Jesus; Paul says "All who desire to live a godly life will suffer persecution," II Tim 3:12, & Christ's disciples were repeatedly arrested for evangelizing, but Christ's disciples didn't have the United States Constitution making it illegal to arrest them; we do! If there are customers that don't like us talking about Jesus, that doesn't make it interference with business; customers not liking the message does not invalidate our free speech rights & is clearly not interference with business. By definition freedom of speech guarantees the people's rights to speak & assemble whether or not people like what we say.

    These U.S. & Ca. case laws & precedent cases listed here demonstrating our rights & freedoms are self-evident & to the best of my knowledge valid & absolute; I do not claim to be an attorney, consult an attorney for legal advice if necessary.